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Abstract
The Anthropic Principle has been proposed as an explanation for the observed value of the cosmological constant. Here we
revisit this proposal by allowing for variation between universes in the amplitude of the scale-invariant primordial cosmological
density perturbations. We derive a priori probability distributions for this amplitude from toy inflationary models in which the
parameter of the inflaton potential is smoothly distributed over possible universes. We find that for such probability distributions,
the likelihood that we live in a typical, anthropically-allowed universe is generally quite small.
 2004 Elsevier B.V. Open access under CC BY license. The Anthropic Principle has been proposed as a
possible solution to the two cosmological constant
problems: why the cosmological constant Λ is orders
of magnitude smaller than any theoretical expectation,
and why it is non-zero and comparable today to the
energy density in other forms of matter [1–3]. This
anthropic argument, which predates direct cosmologi-
cal evidence of the dark energy, is the only theoretical
prediction for a small, non-zero Λ [3,4]. It is based
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Open access under CC BY license. on the observation that the existence of life capable
of measuring Λ requires a universe with cosmological
structures such as galaxies or clusters of stars. A uni-
verse with too large a cosmological constant either
does not develop any structure, since perturbations that
could lead to clustering have not gone non-linear be-
fore the universe becomes dominated by Λ, or else has
a very low probability of exhibiting structure-forming
perturbations, because such perturbations would have
to be so large that they would lie in the far tail-end of
the cosmic variance. The existence of the string theory
landscape, in which causally disconnected regions can
have different cosmological and particle physics prop-
erties, adds support to the notion of an anthropic rule
for selecting a vacuum.
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value of Λ in our universe? Careful analysis by [4]
finds that 5% to 12% of universes would have a cos-
mological constant smaller than our own. In everyday
experience we encounter events at this level of confi-
dence,1 so as an explanation this is not unreasonable.
If the value of Λ is not fixed a priori, then one
might expect other fundamental parameters to vary be-
tween universes as well. This is the case if one sums
over wormhole configurations in the path integral for
quantum gravity [5], as well as in the string theory
landscape [6–9]. In [9] it was emphasized that all the
parameters of the low energy theory would vary over
the space of vacua (“the landscape”). Douglas [7] has
initiated a program to quantify the statistical proper-
ties of these vacua, with additional contributions by
others [8].
In [10], Aguirre stressed that life might be possible
in universes for which some of the cosmological pa-
rameters are orders of magnitude different from those
of our own universe. The point is that large changes
in one parameter can be compensated by changes in
another in such a way that life remains possible. An-
thropic predictions for a particular parameter value
will therefore be weakened if other parameters are al-
lowed to vary between universes. One cosmological
parameter that may significantly affect the anthropic
argument is Q, the standard deviation of the ampli-
tude of primordial cosmological density perturbations.
Rees [11] and Tegmark and Rees [12] have pointed
out that if the anthropic argument is applied to uni-
verses where Q is not fixed but randomly distributed,
then our own universe becomes less likely because
universes with both Λ and Q larger than our own
are anthropically allowed. The purpose of this Letter
is to quantify this expectation within a broad class of
inflationary models. Restrictions on the a priori proba-
bility distribution for Q necessary for obtaining a suc-
cessful anthropic prediction for Λ, were considered in
[13,14].
In our analysis we let both Λ and Q vary between
universes and then quantify the anthropic likelihood
of a positive cosmological constant less than or equal
to that observed in our own universe. We offer a class
of toy inflationary models that allow us to restrict the
1 For instance, drawing two pairs in a poker hand.a priori probability distribution for Q, making only
modest assumptions about the behavior of the a priori
distribution for the parameter of the inflaton poten-
tial in the anthropically-allowed range. Cosmological
and particle physics parameters other than Λ and Q
are held fixed as initial conditions at recombination.
We provisionally adopt Tegmark and Rees’s anthropic
bound on Q: a factor of 10 above and below the value
measured in our universe. Even though this interval is
small, we find that the likelihood that our universe has
a typical cosmological constant is drastically reduced.
The likelihood tends to decrease further if larger inter-
vals are considered.
Weinberg determined in [3] that, in order for an
overdense region to go non-linear before the energy
density of the universe becomes dominated by Λ, the
value of the overdensity δ ≡ δρ/ρ must satisfy
(1)δ >
(
729Λ
500ρ¯
)1/3
.
In a matter-dominated universe this relation has no ex-
plicit time dependence. Here ρ¯ is the energy density
in non-relativistic matter. Perturbations not satisfying
the bound cease to grow once the universe becomes
dominated by the cosmological constant. For a fixed
amplitude of perturbations, this observation provides
an upper bound on the cosmological constant compat-
ible with the formation of structure. Throughout our
analysis we assume that at recombination Λ  ρ¯ .
To quantify whether our universe is a typical,
anthropically-allowed universe, additional assump-
tions about the distribution of cosmological parame-
ters and the spectrum of density perturbations across
the ensemble of universes are needed.
A given slow-roll inflationary model with reheating
leads to a Friedman–Roberston–Walker universe with
a (late-time) cosmological constant Λ and a spectrum
of perturbations that is approximately scale-invariant
and Gaussian with a variance
(2)Q2 ≡ 〈δ˜2〉HC.
The expectation value is computed using the ground
state in the inflationary era and perturbations are eval-
uated at horizon-crossing. The variance is fixed by
the parameters of the inflationary model together with
some initial conditions. Typically, for single-field φ
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(3)Q2 ∼ H
4
φ˙2
∣∣∣∣
HC
.
This leads to spatially separated over- or under-dense
regions with an amplitude δ that for a scale-invariant
spectrum are distributed (at recombination) according
to
(4)N (σ, δ) =
√
2
π
1
σ
e−δ2/2σ 2 .
(The linear relation between Q and the filtered σ in
Eq. (4) is discussed below.)
By Bayes’s theorem, the probability for an anthro-
pically-allowed universe (i.e., the probability that the
cosmological parameters should take certain values,
given that life has evolved to measure them) is pro-
portional to the product of the a priori probability dis-
tribution P for the cosmological parameters, times the
probability that intelligent life would evolve given that
choice of parameter values. Following [4], we estimate
that second factor as being proportional to the mean
fractionF(σ,Λ) of matter that collapses into galaxies.
The latter is obtained in a universe with cosmologi-
cal parameters Λ and σ by spatially averaging over all
over- or under-dense regions, so that [4]
(5)F(σ,Λ) =
∞∫
δmin
dδN(σ, δ)F(δ,Λ).
The lower limit of integration is provided by the
anthropic bound of Eq. (1), which gives δmin ≡
(729Λ/500ρ¯)1/3. The anthropic probability distribu-
tion is
(6)P(σ,Λ) = P(Λ,σ)F(σ,Λ)dΛdσ.
Computing the mean fraction of matter collapsed
into structures requires a model for the growth and
collapse of inhomogeneities. The Gunn–Gott model
[15,16] describes the growth and collapse of an over-
dense spherical region surrounded by a compensat-
ing underdense shell. The weighting function F(δ,Λ)
gives the fraction of mass in the inhomogeneous re-
gion of density contrast δ that eventually collapses
(and then forms galaxies). To a good approximation
it is given by [4]
(7)F(δ,Λ) = δ 1 .
δ + δminAdditional model-dependence occurs in the introduc-
tion of the parameter s given by the ratio of the vol-
ume of overdense sphere to the volume of the under-
dense shell surrounding the sphere. We will set s = 1
throughout.
Since the anthropically allowed values for Λ are
so much smaller than any other mass scale in particle
physics, and since we assume that Λ = 0 is not a spe-
cial point in the landscape, we follow [4,17] in using
the approximation P(Λ)  P(Λ = 0) for Λ within the
anthropically allowed window.2 The requirement that
the universe not recollapse before intelligent life has
had time to evolve anthropically rules out large nega-
tive Λ [2,19]. We will assume that the anthropic cutoff
for negative Λ is close enough to Λ = 0 that all Λ < 0
may be ignored in our calculations.
As an example of a concrete model for the variation
in Q between universes, we consider inflaton poten-
tials of the form (see, for example, [20])
(8)V = Λ+ λφ2p,
where p is a positive integer.3 We assume there are
additional couplings that provide an efficient reheating
mechanism, but are unimportant for the evolution of φ
during the inflationary epoch. The standard deviation
of the amplitude of perturbations gives
(9)Q = A√λ φ
p+1
HC
M3Pl
,
where A is a constant, and φHC is the value of the
field when the mode of wave number k leaves the hori-
zon. This φHC has logarithmic dependence on λ and k,
which we neglect. Randomness in the initial value for
φ affects only those modes that are (exponentially)
well outside our horizon. Throughout this Letter, we
will set the spectral index to one and ignore its run-
ning. Eq. (9) then gives λ ∝ Q2.
Next, suppose that the fundamental parameters of
the Lagrangian are not fixed, but vary between uni-
verses, as might be expected if one sums over worm-
hole configurations in the path integral for quantum
2 Garriga and Vilenkin point to examples of quintessence models
in which the approximation P (Λ)  P (Λ = 0) in the anthropically-
allowed range is not valid [18].
3 Recent analysis of astronomical data disfavors the λφ4 infla-
tionary model [21], but for generality we will consider an arbitrary p
in Eq. (8).
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obtain the correct normalization for the density per-
turbations observed in our universe, the self-coupling
must be extremely small. As the standard deviation
Q will be allowed to vary by an order of magnitude
around 10−5, for this model the self-coupling in alter-
nate universes will be very small as well.
We may then perform an expansion about λ = 0 for
the a priori probability distribution of λ. The small-
ness of λ suggests that we may keep only the leading
term in that expansion. If the a priori probability dis-
tribution extends to negative values of λ (which are
anthropically excluded due to the instability of the re-
sulting action for φ), we expect it to be smooth near
λ = 0, and the leading term in the power series expan-
sion to be zeroth order in λ (i.e., a constant). Therefore
we expect a flat a priori probability distribution for λ.
The a priori probability distribution for Q is then
(10)P(Q) ∝ dλ
dQ
∼ Q,
where the normalization constant is determined by
the range of integration in Q. Note that this distrib-
ution favors large Q. On the other hand, if the a priori
probability distribution for the coupling λ only has
support for λ > 0 then λ = 0 is a special point and
we cannot argue that P(Q) ∝ Q. However, since the
anthropically-allowed values of λ are very small, the
a priori distribution for λ should be dominated, in the
anthropically-allowed window, by a leading term such
as P(λ) ∼ λq . Normalizability requires q > −1. Us-
ing λ ∝ Q2, this gives P(Q) ∼ Q2q+1.
Before proceeding, it is convenient to transform to
the new variables:
(11)y ≡ Λ
ρ∗
, σˆ ≡ σ
(
ρ¯
ρ∗
)1/3
.
Here ρ¯ is the energy-density in non-relativistic mat-
ter at recombination, which we take to be fixed in
all universes, and ρ∗ is the value for the present-day
energy density of non-relativistic matter in our own
universe. For a matter-dominated universe σˆ is time-
independent, whereas y is constant for any era. Here
and throughout this Letter, a subscript ∗ denotes the
value that is observed in our universe for the corre-
sponding quantity. The only quantities whose varia-
tion from universe to universe we will consider are y
and σˆ .In terms of these variables and following [4], the
probability distribution of Eq. (6) is found to be
(12)P = N dσˆ dy P (σˆ )
∞∫
β
dx
e−x
β1/2 + x1/2 ,
where
(13)β ≡ 1
2σˆ 2
(
729y
500
)2/3
,
and N is the normalization constant.
Notice that, since x  β , large β implies that P ∼
e−β  1. For a fixed σˆ , large y implies large β .
Thus, for fixed σˆ , large cosmological constants are
anthropically disfavored. But if σˆ is allowed to in-
crease, then β ∼O(1) may be maintained at larger y .
Garriga and Vilenkin have pointed out that the distrib-
ution in Eq. (12) may be rewritten using the change of
variables (σˆ , y) 	→ (σˆ , β) [14]. The Jacobian for that
transformation is a function only of σˆ . Eq. (12) then
factorizes into two parts: one depending only on σˆ ,
the other only on β . Integration over σˆ produces an
overall multiplicative factor that cancels out after nor-
malization, so that any choice of P(σˆ ) will give the
same distribution for the dimensionless parameter β .
In that sense, even in a scenario where σˆ is randomly
distributed, the computation in [4] may be seen as an
anthropic prediction for β .4 The measured value of β
is, indeed, typical of anthropically-allowed universes,
but an anthropic explanation for β alone does not ad-
dress the problem of why both Λ and Q should be so
small in our universe.
Implementing the Anthropic Principle requires
making an assumption about the minimum mass of
“stuff”, collapsed into stars, galaxies, or clusters of
galaxies, that is needed for the formation of life. It is
more convenient to express the minimum mass Mmin
in terms of a comoving scale R: Mmin = 4πρ¯a3eqR3/3
(by convention a = 1 today, so R is a physical scale).
We do not know the precise value of R. A better un-
derstanding of biology would in principle determine
its value, which should only depend on chemistry, the
fraction of matter in the form of baryons, and New-
ton’s constant. In our analysis these are all fixed initial
conditions at recombination. In particular, we would
4 We thank Garriga and Vilenkin for explaining this point to us.
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even though the relation between Mmin and R de-
pends on present-day cosmological parameters, the
value of this threshold will be constant between uni-
verses because it depends only on parameters that we
are treating as fixed initial conditions. Thus, in com-
puting the probability distribution over universes, we
will fix R. Since we do not know what is the correct
anthropic value for R, we will present our results for
both R = 1 and 2 Mpc. (R on the order of a few Mpc
corresponds to requiring that structures as large as our
galaxy be necessary for life.)
We then proceed to filter out perturbations with
wavelength smaller than R, leading to a variance σ 2
that depends on the filtering scale. Expressed in terms
of the power spectrum evaluated at recombination,
(14)σ 2 = 1
2π2
∞∫
0
dk k2P(k)W 2(kR)
where W is the filter function, which we take to be a
Gaussian W(x) = e−x2/2. P(k) is the power spectrum,
which we assume to be scale-invariant. (For P(k) we
use Eq. (39) of [4], setting n = 1.)
Evaluating (14) at recombination gives, for our uni-
verse,
(15)σˆ∗ = C∗Q∗.
The number C∗ contains the growth factor and transfer
function evaluated from horizon crossing to recombi-
nation and only depends on physics from that era. We
assume Λ is small enough so that at recombination
it can be ignored and thus we take the variation in σˆ
between universes to come solely from its explicit de-
pendence on Q.
We may then use observations of Q∗ and σ∗ to
determine σˆ = C∗Q, valid for all universes. We use
the explicit expression for C∗ that is obtained from
Eqs. (39)–(43) and (48)–(51) in Ref. [4]. This takes
as inputs the Hubble parameter H0 ≡ 100h∗ km/s,
the energy density in non-relativistic matter Ω∗, the
cosmological constant λ∗ = 1 − Ω∗, the baryon frac-
tion Ωb = 0.023h−2∗ , the smoothing scale R, and the
5 Note, however, that requiring life to last for billions of years
(long enough for it to develop intelligence and the ability to do as-
tronomy) might place bounds on Q. See [12].COBE normalized amplitude of fluctuations at horizon
crossing, Q∗ = 1.94 × 10−5Ω−0.785–0.05∗lnΩ∗∗ .
As we have argued, the dependence of C∗ on the
cosmological constant is not relevant for our pur-
poses. For our calculations we use Ω∗ = 0.134h−2∗ ,
and h∗ = 0.73 (consistent with their observed best-fit
values [22]). The smoothing scale R will be taken to
be either 1 Mpc or 2 Mpc, and the corresponding val-
ues for C∗ are 5.2 × 104 and 3.8 × 104.
The values chosen for the range of Q are moti-
vated by the discussion in [12] about anthropic limits
on the amplitude of the primordial density perturba-
tions. The authors of [12] argue that Q between 10−3
and 10−1 leads to the formation of numerous super-
massive black holes which might obstruct the emer-
gence of life.6 They then claim that universes with
Q less than 10−6 are less likely to form stars, or if
star clusters do form, that they would not be bound
strongly enough to retain supernova remnants. Since
there is considerable uncertainty in these limits, we
carry out calculations using both the range indicated
by [12] as well as a range that is somewhat broader.7
Previous work on applying the Anthropic Principle
to variable Λ and Q has assumed a priori distributions
P(Q) that fall off as 1/Qk for large Q, with k  3
[13,14]. Such distributions were chosen in order to
keep the anthropic probability P(y,Q) normalizable,
and they usually yield anthropic predictions for the
cosmological constant similar to those that were ob-
tained in [4] by fixing Q to its observed value, because
they naturally favor a Q as small as its observed value
in our universe. For instance, for P(Q) ∝ 1/Q3 in
the range Q∗/10 < Q < 10Q∗, P(y < y∗) = 5% for
R = 1 Mpc, while P(y < y∗) = 7% for R = 2 Mpc.)
However, if we accept the argument of Tegmark
and Rees in [12] that there are natural anthropic cutoffs
on Q, it follows that the behavior of P(Q) is irrel-
6 They also note that for Q > 10−4 formation of life is possible,
but planetary disruptions caused by flybys may make it unlikely for
planetary life to last billions of years.
7 Notice that we are using the ranges indicated in [12] as ab-
solute anthropic cutoffs. Arguments like those made in [12] intro-
duce some correction to the approximation made in [4] that the
probability of life is proportional to the amount of matter that col-
lapses into compact structures. Since we are largely ignorant of what
the form of this correction is, we have approximated it as a simple
window function.
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Anthropically determined properties of the cosmological constant
P (Q) ∝ 1/Q0.9 in the range P (Q) ∝ Q in the range
Q∗/10 <Q < 10Q∗ Q∗/15 < Q< 15Q∗ Q∗/10 < Q< 10Q∗ Q∗/15 <Q< 15Q∗
R = 1 Mpc R = 2 Mpc R = 1 Mpc R = 2 Mpc R = 1 Mpc R = 2 Mpc R = 1 Mpc R = 2 Mpc
P (y < y∗) 1 × 10−3 3 × 10−3 4 × 10−4 1 × 10−3 5 × 10−4 1 × 10−3 1 × 10−4 4 × 10−4
〈y〉/y∗ 1 × 104 4 × 103 4 × 104 1 × 104 1 × 104 5 × 103 4 × 104 2 × 104
y5%/y∗ 9 × 10 4 × 10 3 × 102 1 × 102 2 × 102 7 × 10 6 × 102 2 × 102
Table 2
Anthropically determined properties of the amplitude for density perturbations
P (Q) ∝ 1/Q0.9 in the range P (Q) ∝ Q in the range
Q∗/10 <Q < 10Q∗ Q∗/15 < Q< 15Q∗ Q∗/10 < Q< 10Q∗ Q∗/15 <Q < 15Q∗
R = 1 Mpc R = 2 Mpc R = 1 Mpc R = 2 Mpc R = 1 Mpc R = 2 Mpc R = 1 Mpc R = 2 Mpc
P (Q< Q∗) 8 × 10−4 8 × 10−4 2 × 10−4 2 × 10−4 1 × 10−5 1 × 10−5 1 × 10−6 1 × 10−6
〈Q〉/Q∗ 8 8 11 11 8 8 13 13
Q5%/Q∗ 4 4 6 6 5 5 8 8evant to the normalizability of P(y,Q). Furthermore,
P(Q) ∼ 1/Qk in the neighborhood of Q = 0 for k  1
leads to an unnormalizable distribution, since the inte-
gral
∫
P(Q)dQ blows up. In what follows we shall
consider two a priori distributions: P(Q) ∝ Q, and
P(Q) ∝ 1/Q0.9 inside the anthropic window, moti-
vated by the inflationary models we have discussed.
The results are summarized in Table 1, where
P(y < y∗) is the anthropic probability that the value y
be no greater than what is observed in our own uni-
verse, 〈y〉 is the anthropically-weighed mean value
of y , and y5% is the value of y such that the anthropic
probability of obtaining a value no greater than that
is 5%.
By comparison, for this choice of cosmological
parameters, the authors of [4] find that, for Q fixed
(or measured), the probability of a universe having
a cosmological constant no greater than our own is
much higher: P(y < 0.7/0.3)= 0.05 and 0.1, for R =
1 Mpc and R = 2 Mpc, respectively.8
One can also ask what is the probability of observ-
ing a value for Q in the range Q∗/10 < Q < Q∗, af-
ter averaging over all possible cosmological constants.
Table 2 summarizes the resulting distribution in Q.
8 These numbers are taken from Table 1 in the published version
of Ref. [4].In summary, inflation and a landscape of anthropi-
cally determined coupling constants provides (in some
scenarios) a conceptually clean framework for varia-
tion between universes in the magnitude of Q. Since
increasing Q allows the probability of structure to re-
main non-negligible for Λ considerably larger than in
our own universe, anthropic solutions to the cosmo-
logical constant problem are weakened by allowing Q
as well as Λ to vary from one universe to another.
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